

CONFIDENTIAL

9 November 1948

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILES

SUBJECT: IM - 71

REFERENCE: Memo to the Executive Director and
Chief, ICAPS, from [redacted]
dated 8 Nov 1948, Subj: IM - 71

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1. At a meeting on the afternoon of November 8 with Messrs. Babbitt, [redacted], and [redacted] of CIA, and Mr. Evans of State, following conversation about the memorandum of November 8 sent to the Director and the Deputy Director, it was decided that this particular paper was so entirely in State's field of primary interest that OIR of State would prepare the first draft which might well be the entire paper, unless it were found necessary to supplement it with information from the Army's Civil Affairs Division.

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2. In view of the fact that [redacted] of CIA has done considerable work on this paper, he and his work will be utilized by State in the preparation of the paper.

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3. In the future, [redacted] will discuss such projects in advance with the interested IAC agencies before circulating them with a memorandum similar to this IM - 71.

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The IM-71 memo of Oct 22 will be withdrawn.

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[redacted]
PRESCOTT CHILDS
Chief, ICAPS

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Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Executive Director
Chief, ICAPS *1/2*

DATE: 8 November 1948

FROM :

SUBJECT: IM - 71

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1. This afternoon I attended three meetings relative to the Proposed "Departmental Participation in Production of CIA Intelligence Memorandum." *attached hereto*

2. The first meeting was with Mr. Merritt Booth of the Department of State. He contended that under NSC 4, it was proper for the NSC 4 staff committee of Mr. Oechsner to request this assistance from CIA. The main problem involved, however, was whether CIA, under its responsibility for coordination, would recognize that the Department of State was dominant in the fields of political and sociological activity and that, since this paper was mainly involved in these areas, ORE should have asked State Department Intelligence to produce the required material.

3. I next met with Mr. Ted Babbitt, Assistant Director, ORE, and the CIA member on Mr. Oechsner's committee. Mr. Babbitt was quite obviously disturbed about why ICAPS was involved in this project and questioned me as to how it was brought to my attention. I told him that, as the State Department member on ICAPS, the State Department called me about the subject paper because they were not too pleased with the way it was drawn up. (Ref: DCI 3/1, paragraph 3b.) I then satisfied Mr. Babbitt that my first reaction was to bring the matter to the attention of his office by calling upon for a copy of IM - 71 with attachment. It was then necessary for me to further explain to Mr. Babbitt that the meeting of this afternoon between Mr. Oechsner and Mr. Allen Evans was in no way arranged by me. After quelling some of Mr. Babbitt's apprehensions about the primary recognition of ORE in this project, we then got into a fundamental discussion as to the differences between the viewpoints of the Department of State, OIR, and CIA, ORE. When such preliminary sharpening of the weapons had taken place, we three went to Mr. Fred Oechsner's office, and met with Mr. Allen Evans and Mr. Oechsner.

4. I initiated the discussion in Mr. Oechsner's office by explaining the ICAPS viewpoint:

- a. that there was no question in our mind regarding the right of Mr. Oechsner, under NSC 4, to ask CIA for the intelligence support;
- b. that we felt that all of the material and responsibility for this undertaking were within the Department of State and that, as such, ORE should have performed its task of interdepartmental coordination in this instance by a complete recognition that State should do this job for the NSC 4 staff.

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5. Mr. Babbitt injected the thought that I was speaking as a member of the Department of State rather than a member of CIA. I smiled and replied that I was speaking as the State Department member of ICAPS.

6. Mr. Oechsner then pulled out NSC 4 to support his viewpoint that he had acted correctly in making this request on CIA. Mr. Allen Evans said that he was not fully convinced of the exclusiveness of this procedure, but that he would not labor that point.

7. Mr. Evans then went on to explain that the reason they were upset at the Department of State was that he felt all of the material requested in subject document was within the responsibility of the Department of State and, furthermore, that some of the items were covered by the NIS Program.

8. The discussion then began to drift from the original topics under consideration, as for example when Mr. Oechsner contended that he felt his committee, by its interdepartmental composition and structure, should make all its requests for any intelligence support on CIA rather than direct on any one intelligence activity. At this point, I suggested that we come back to the fundamental question under discussion, and it was agreed:

a. that Mr. Oechsner had acted properly in making the request of CIA, and that he was not involved in the subsequent modis operandi between ORE and OIR.

b. that a meeting will be held at 2 p.m. next Monday, 8 November, 1948, in Mr. Babbitt's office. It will be attended by Mr. Evans, and such representatives of the Department of State that he may bring, to discuss the fundamental inter-departmental intelligence coordination question, and:

c. Mr. Oechsner agreed that the date of December 31, 1948, which was noted in IM - 71 is not rigid. He remarked that it would be much more preferable to spend six months in the production of a worth-while intelligence support rather than present a hurried-up shallow viewpoint.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
 OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO		INITIALS	DATE
1	Executive Director	<i>absent on leave</i>	
2	Deputy Director	<i>410</i>	<i>11/8/48</i>
3	Exec Director	<i>RHR</i>	<i>11-8-48</i>
4	Chief, ICaps		
5			
FROM		INITIALS	DATE
1	Chief, ICAPS	<i>B</i>	8 Nov '48
2			
3			

<input type="checkbox"/> APPROVAL	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> INFORMATION	<input type="checkbox"/> SIGNATURE
<input type="checkbox"/> ACTION	<input type="checkbox"/> DIRECT REPLY	<input type="checkbox"/> RETURN
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> COMMENT	<input type="checkbox"/> PREPARATION OF REPLY	<input type="checkbox"/> DISPATCH
<input type="checkbox"/> CONCURRENCE	<input type="checkbox"/> RECOMMENDATION	<input type="checkbox"/> FILE

REMARKS:

As I see it, the confusion on this matter could have been avoided if ORE had consulted OIR as provided in paragraph 3b of DCI 3/1.


Such initial conversations would have shown that the State Department had all, or practically all, of the necessary information on this subject in its files already so that OIR could prepare the

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Estimate on this matter which is of primary concern only to the State Department.

The other IAC agencies have little or anything on this subject, so we fail to see where CIA comes into this picture.


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